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Abstract 
The cassava system in Nigeria is developing, with increasing attention to its potential positive 
outcomes. However, credit access is a major problem in expanding productive activities of the 
different actors across the value chains of cassava products. This study investigates the extent of 
access to credit by cassava actors with respect to the different financial institutions in the country 
using data obtained from a sample of 168 actors, including producers, processors, marketers, 
fabricators and end users. The study found that commercial banks had the highest disbursement 
rate (88.0%) despite higher interest rate charged, while government banks had the least (73.6%). 
Processors (79.5%) and marketers (79.4%) had highest credit access rate while fabricators (67.5%) 
had the least. Regression results revealed that cassava actors that patronized commercial banks 
particularly those who are medium scale had access to higher amount of credit. However, female 
actors and those using cooperative banks secured lower credit amount. In line with the results, 
Nigeria should champion private-sector-led credit provision through appropriate policies aimed 
at improving the capacity of the institutions. Financial institutions should be strengthened for 
better credit access by the cassava actors, and hence improve their productivity. 
Keywords: Financial institutions, Value Chain Actors, Cassava, Credit. 
 
1. Introduction 
Nigeria is the largest producer of cassava roots in the world with an estimated 36.8 million 
metric ton (MT), mostly produced by smallholder farmers on fragmented land holdings of about 1-
5 ha per farmer and at an average yield of 12 MT/ha [1]. Notwithstanding the leading role of 
Nigeria in global cassava production, the country can still leverage on some enabling factors for 
better production and improved welfare of the smallholder producers and other actors along the 
cassava value chain, especially through value addition. Timely access to sufficient credit has been 
adjudged as one of the critical factors needed for the success of producers and other actors along 
agricultural value chains in Africa [2].  
Although access to credit is critical to agricultural production and welfare [3], farming 
households in Nigeria are usually confronted with poor credit access [4]. The trend in agricultural 
access to credit [5] reveals that between 1991 and 2006, the agricultural sector obtained annual 
average credit up to the tune of $US500 million, which rose above $US1 billion in 2007. Although 
there was a rise in credit availability between 2010 and 2014, there has been decline since then. 
When agricultural credit obtained was viewed as a share of total domestic credit available to all 
sectors in the economy, the agricultural sector was seen to be lacking. Although highest values of 
agricultural credit shares occurred in 1994 and 1996, these were less than 20% of total available 
credit. In addition, there was a dip in 1997 and the shares had been mostly on a downward trend up 
till recent times [5].  
In order to improve the poor nature of agricultural financing in Nigeria, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) instituted intervention policies, projects and program. These 
programs include the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF), the Agricultural 
Credit Support Scheme (ACSS), the Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme (CACS) and the 
Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL). The ACGSF was 
instituted in 1977 but started operation in 1978 with the objective of guaranteeing loans disbursed 
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by commercial banks for agricultural purposes in order to increase credit provision in the sector. 
The ACSS was established through collaborative efforts of FGN, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and 
Bankers’ Committee with the main intention of giving credit to producers at single-digit interest 
rate and encouraging repayment through 6.0% rebate on credit facility. In similar vein, the CACS, 
which was a joint effort of CBN and Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(FMARD) was designed to promote commercial agriculture in Nigeria while NIRSAL, had a N75 
billion [$1 = N164.64] take-off grant to address risks in agriculture through credit guarantees in 
order to make agricultural lending more attractive to financial institutions [6,7]. All the institutional 
efforts had seen the number of guaranteed loans oscillating with increasing magnitudes though the 
total amount has been rising considerably up till 2014, when it started declining [8].   
Apart from these well-known financing schemes, new schemes have also emerged in recent 
years. These include the Paddy Aggregation Scheme (PAS) specifically established in 2017 and 
funded from the CACS fund to boost local rice production and make the staple affordable to the 
local consumers; the Agri-Business/Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Scheme (AGSMEIS) 
established by the Bankers’ Committee in 2017 to “support FGN’s efforts at promoting agricultural 
businesses as vehicles of employment generation and sustainable economic growth” and the 
Accelerated Agriculture Development Scheme (AADS) aimed at recruiting youths on annual basis 
thereby solving manpower problem in the agricultural value chain [8].  However, these have been 
continually thwarted by inadequate funding and poor coverage, as the number of guaranteed loans 
is not commensurate with the smallholder population in need of such within the economy.   
Many studies conducted in Nigeria have identified salient factors affecting credit access. 
Adebayo and Adeola [9] focused on credit use in Oyo state, Nigeria and identified age, marital 
status, household size and amount requested as significant determinants affecting credit access. 
They, however, observed interest rate as the greatest constraint to credit access. Mbutor et al. [6] 
studied the relationship between agricultural financing and production in Nigeria using Vector 
Error Correction (VECM) method and discovered that despite the realization of the importance of 
financing to the sector, output was largely driven by weather variables and not by credit provision. 
Ayeomoni and Aladejana [10] applied the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) econometric 
approach to time series data spanning 1986-2014. The study found both short and long-run 
relationships between agricultural credit and economic growth in Nigeria. On the other hand, while 
examining the effect of credit status on technical efficiency of cassava farmers in Oyo State, [11] 
found that credit constraint reduced technical efficiency of the cassava producers while age, 
education, farming experience and membership of farmers’ group were the important factors 
determining farmers’ credit status.  
Several financial institutions have been involved in agricultural financing in Nigeria. However, 
the extents of their involvements differ in terms of volume and value of financing. Recent (2017) 
disbursement figures for the ACGS showed that out of the 58,548 loans totaling N8.1 billion, 
microfinance banks granted 98% of the total volume and 97% of the total value. The remaining 
percentages were granted by commercial banks [8]. Although, it is widely recognized that the 
private sector has key role in agricultural value chain financing [12], government-owned financial 
institutions can also be effective in finance provision. Indications from Madagascar, Tanzania and 
Zambia showed that credit providers were ready to assist farmers and processors with loans of 
favorable terms but under the coverage of the government guarantee scheme [13]. This is also 
evident from success stories from within and outside Africa. Manganhele [14] noted that 
government intervention in agricultural production and commercialization and offering of 
protection against vagaries of macroeconomic conditions, particularly inflation is crucial as is the 
case with Zimbabwe; diversification and risk-sharing as evident from Botswana; technologically-
driven need-specific credit provision in Thailand; and good regulatory environment, absence of 




The importance of financing the agricultural sector in general and cassava value chain in 
particular is not limited to Nigeria. Cassava root is a staple that cut across several other African 
countries and the governments and private sectors of these countries are making remarkable efforts 
to increase its production through financing. Coulibaly et al. [15] gave insights into cassava value 
chain financing situation in several West African countries. Most of the (informal) finance providers 
in Ghana were mostly well-educated males, in contrast to Cote d’Ivoire where there is sex balance. 
Almost all the providers in Ghana give out credit to actors unlike in Cote d’Ivoire where 
approximately 50% do so. Thus, coupled with the prohibitive interest rate, high transaction cost and 
not taking the peculiar characteristics of agricultural production into consideration, demands of the 
cassava actors could not be adequately met. In Liberia, the cassava sector begs for financing bail-out 
as only a quarter of cassava traders (who are the most prominent in the sector) were able to access 
credit from formal financial institutions and the other actors too had to rely on informal sources. 
Elsewhere in Africa, Rwanda’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) is 
specific about the role of agriculture (of which cassava production feature prominently) since it 
accounts for almost a third of the national GDP and employs 75% of the total workforce. Thus, 
financing such a sector is critical for agricultural transformation and financial inclusiveness for 
overall growth and development [16]. 
         There is great potential for the development of cassava value chain in Nigeria both from 
supply and demand sides, but it is wrought with many challenges. Generally, there are (limited or) 
no formal financing from financial institutions and available micro-credit schemes are neither 
widely-spread nor cover all sector needs. Furthermore, fund provision for small processing 
equipment is virtually non-existent while large processors access funds that are tied to product 
supply to end-users. In all, the financing scheme is not integrated to take care of all actors, 
simultaneously [17]. With respect to Sierra Leone, ease of access to credit has been identified as a 
way of developing the cassava value chain [15]. In Mozambique, the effort at providing credit for 
agricultural financing has been slowed down by lack of institutional capacity to ensure timely loan 
repayment, rural market failures, shortage of funds, inexperienced management personnel, lack of 
government support for private sector finance providers, political interference and high interest 
rate [14][18]. In the case of Uganda, more than three-fifths of the financial service providers charge 
interest rates in the range of 23-30% in a year, making it difficult for the cassava value chain actors 
to access credit [19]. In addition, there is no co-ordination among the various actors involved in the 
cassava value chain in contrast to the institutions (governmental, non-governmental, local and 
foreign organizations) which together influence the workings of the actors through capacity 
building, input supply, machineries provision, value addition services, financial and market linkage 
supports, among others [20]. Although there are formal lenders in Rwanda, people still use 
informal credit providers mostly. Notwithstanding the challenges, Rwanda has the key institutional 
foundation to scale up agricultural financing [16]. 
          In view of the important role of cassava in the African and West African sub-regional 
agricultural systems, there is need to assess specific roles of the financial institutions with respect to 
cassava value chain financing. This is particularly salient for Nigeria, being the largest producer of 
cassava in the world. Thus, the pertinent questions in this respect are: Does institution type really 
affect access to credit for cassava actors? What other factors dictate actors’ access to credit? To 
address these questions, the study employed Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression technique 
and the Instrumental Variable (IV) regression estimation using Generalized Methods of Moment 
(GMM). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 dwells on some theoretical and 
conceptual issues surrounding credit markets, Section 3 addresses different aspects of the research 
methodology, Section 4 presents the results while Section 5 caps the paper with conclusion and 
policy recommendations. 
 
2. Theoretical and Conceptual Issues in Credit Markets 
4 
 
A growing body of literature has emerged to provide theoretical perspectives to the 
operationalization of financial markets. Specifically, the works tried to emphasize the role of 
imperfect information and incomplete markets on the running of financial markets particularly in 
developing nations.  The crucial focus on these factors is as a result of the connection between 
financial markets imperfections and income inequality [21]. Financial market imperfections are 
usually considered to be core mechanisms through which inequality adversely affect growth 
because inequality persists as a result of these imperfections [22]. 
Stiglitz and Weiss [23] pioneered the attempts to explain the role of credit rationing in credit 
market. According to [23], a loan market in equilibrium may be characterized by credit rationing. 
For instance, banks giving out loans are basically concerned about how risky a loan is and the 
possible interest that can be received from it. It is however good to note that the interest rate 
charged by a bank contributes significantly to the degree of riskiness of the loans. This can take the 
form of sorting potential borrowers or affecting the actions of borrowers. Sorting potential 
borrowers, otherwise referred to as adverse selection effect, can be used to screen borrowers into 
“good borrowers” or “bad debtors” based on the assumption that customers who are ready to pay 
high interest rate may do so because they know that their probability of paying back is low. By 
implication, the higher the interest rates charged by banks, the higher will be the riskiness of loan 
repayment, with a possible downward effect on the bank’s profits. Interest rate can also affect the 
actions of the borrowers and this is termed the incentive effect. Charging high interest rates affects 
the behavior of the borrowers as the return obtained from successful projects decreases with high 
interest rate.  
In line with the stated assumptions, [24] analyzed the conditions of rural financial markets in 
developing countries. The study showed that a wide variety of rural settings exists and as such 
financial markets are highly fragmented and imperfect. While lenders might have a good idea 
about the average characteristics of the pool of potential borrowers, they may not have complete 
information concerning the characteristics of any particular borrower [25]. As a result, potential 
borrowers are categorized across different financial contracts based on their personal characteristics 
and financial activities.  This explains why firms within the same market environment can have 
their loans processed and designed using financial instruments that vary in terms of the loan 
conditions [24]. The financial instruments include interest rate, size and type of collateral, contract 
forms, resources expended on monitoring and implementation of contract terms and conditions 
among others. Similarly, in his review of empirical literatures on rural financial markets, [26] 
argued that there exists extreme variability in the interest rates charged by lenders for superficially 
similar loan transactions within the same economy. However, to limit the consequences of 
information asymmetry in rural areas, three devices which are collateral requirements, usufruct 
loans and rotating savings and credit association are commonly used [27].  
Empirically, research on the use of credit by rural households tends to imply that although it is 
not obvious that demand for credit far outweighs the supply, there are significant obstacles to the 
transformation of potential demand into revealed demand [28]. According to [23], both demand for 
loans and the supply of funds depends on interest rate which in turn is determined by the financial 
institution’s expected return at r*. The study further explained that, in the case of unmet loan 
requests, unsatisfied borrowers may offer higher interest rate to the bank until supply of funds 
equals demand. However, this situation is only obtainable under traditional analysis, as banks will 
not give out loans beyond r*, even if borrowers are willing to offer interest rate beyond this point. 
Consequently, market failure in credit markets prompts household to switch profits between 
activities in order to finance their working capital and this therefore explains the complementarity 
of formal and informal financial institutions [29]. 
 
3. Materials and Methods  
3.1. Study Area  
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         The study was conducted in six states located in four out of the six geopolitical zones of 
Nigeria. These zones include South West, South East, South South and the North Central. These 
zones were selected based on the fact that several cassava programmes and research including root 
and tuber expansion programs have long been put in place and on-going in these areas. One such 
program is the “Cassava multiplication program” supported by the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), which is subsumed under the “Root and Tuber Expansion 
Program (RTEP)”. This programme was implemented in 26 states of the Federation majority of 
which were located in these four geopolitical zones. Apart from the fact this programme was meant 
to contribute to the food security efforts of the FGN, it was also meant to improve cassava yields 
and increase the output of smallholder farmers.  Thus, two states each from the South West (Oyo 
and Ogun) and South East (Abia and Enugu); one state from the South South (Rivers) and the FCT 
from North Central were selected for study. Target groups that were investigated in the study 
include different formal credit institutions, cooperatives and individuals who are cassava actors-
cum-customers of the different financial institutions. 
 
3.2. Data type and Source 
         The study relied mostly on primary data, which were collected with three well-structured 
questionnaires designed to elicit information from the three target groups – formal financial 
institutions, cooperatives and individuals engaged with the financial institutions (i.e the cassava 
value chain actors consisting of producers, processors, marketers, fabricators and end users). 
Information were collected as follows: 
i.  Financial institutions- Information on institutional characteristics, financial services rendered, type 
of client such services were rendered to along the cassava value chain, terms and condition of 
services, difficulties encountered and way to overcome such difficulties while rendering financial 
services;  
ii.  Individuals users – Type of financial institution associated with, types of financial service(s) 
obtained from credit institution, adequacy of such services, difficulties encountered while accessing 
financial services and ways of reducing such difficulties. 
 
3.3. Sampling Procedure 
         A multi-stage sampling approach was used to sample both the financial institutions and 
clients resident in the six states studied. In the first stage, financial institutions were stratified into 
four strata namely: government owned, commercial, microfinance and cooperatives. Stage two 
involved the identification of the various financial institutions before the random or purposive 
selection (in some cases) of each of them in each of the three stratums. For example, for the stratum 
consisting of government owned financial institutions, both the Bank of Industry and Bank of 
Agriculture were purposively selected for study. This was because they were known to be the 
government-owned institutions used mostly by government to disburse agricultural credit. In the 
other three strata, the financial institutions were randomly selected. For the stratum consisting of 
commercial institution only five banks consisting of both the old and new generation banks (First 
Bank, Unity bank, Union Bank, United Bank of Africa (UBA) and Enterprise Bank) were selected, 
while for the microfinance banks ten banks were sampled. Higher number were sampled for the 
cooperatives owing to their proliferation. All these sections were replicated across the six states. The 
last stage entailed the random sampling of clients from each of the financial institutions sampled. 
The sampled clients were made of individuals who were selected at almost equitable proportion 
across the various financial institutions within each stratum. The respondents were drawn from the 
list of agricultural clients engaged in the cassava industry provided by the various financial 
institutions.  
         In order to obtain the number of banks and respondents to be sampled in each state, we 
applied an equitable distribution principle over selection proportionate to the size of either the 
LGAs or the EAs in each state (see Table C.1 in the appendix). The percentages for states with larger 
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distribution were however prorated slightly downwards to accommodate more samples for states 
with smaller distribution so that each zone may be sufficiently represented. The last column of 
Table C.1 shows the final percentages used for obtaining the number of enumeration areas sampled 
in each of the states and zones for financial institutions and individual users of financial 
institutions. In all a total of 912 respondents consisting of 108 formal financial institutions, 288 
cooperatives and 516 individual users of financial institutions were sampled (see Table C.2 in the 
appendix for the distribution across zones). However, from the total number sampled only 317 
(about one third) retrieved and properly filled questionnaires consisting of 52 formal financial 
institutions, 65 cooperatives and 200 individual users of financial institutions were used for 
analysis. Finally, 168 individuals were used in this paper because complete information could only 
be extracted for this number across the different financial institutions.  
 
3.4. Model Specification  
Two models were utilized for this study: the Ordinary Least Square-OLS regression technique 
and the Instrumental Variable (IV) regression, which was introduced at a point to correct for 
endogeneity. The Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) option was used for the IV because it is 
the ‘mainstay of econometric procedure’ [30]. These models were used to assess the determinants of 
the amount of credit accessed by the value chain actors with differences in the underlying 
assumptions which is with and without consideration for bi-causality. The OLS regression is 




lnYi = log of the amount of loan received from financial institution in Naira by the i-th actor. 
The explanatory variables for the OLS are: X1 = Age (years); X2 = Sex (female=1, male=0);  X3 = Years 
of education;  X4 = Marital status (single=1, married=0); X5 = Household size; X6 = Primary 
occupation (agriculture=1, non-agriculture=0);  X7 = Years of specialization; X8 = Monthly income 
(N); X9 = Association membership; X10 = Interest rate (%); Financial institution variable dummies 
[X11= Cooperative, X12 = Commercial, X13 = Microfinance]; Specialization dummies [X14 = Processor, 
X15 = Marketer, X16= Fabricator, X17 = End-user]; Scale of operation dummies [X18 = Medium scale, X19 
= Large scale].  
Each of the categories of financial institution type, specialization and scale of operation are 
dummy variables specified thus: D=1 if Yes; 0 otherwise. Estimations were made for different 
elements of the categorical variables using one of the elements as the base. In this wise, the 
government bank, producers and small-scale operation where base variables for the financial 
institution, specialization and scale of operation dummies respectively. Post-analysis tests were 
carried out to ensure correctness of the variables chosen and the models specified. 
The possibility of bi-causality between financial institution type and amount of loan granted 
was further assessed. For instance, the case for bi-causality may arise when the amount disbursed 
to a cassava value chain actor is a function of the financial institution approached for loan. On the 
other hand, the amount of finance at hand or being used to run an enterprise could dictate the type 
of institution an actor domiciles his business fund to be able to access available credit facilities. This 
two-way relationship was tested through instrumental variable (IV) approach. The specification of 
the relationship between amount of loan granted and institution is expressed by     
  
where  
 = 0 + 1
1 + 2
2 + ⋯ +  
 +                  … (1) 
 =  ()                             … (2) 
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lnLi is the log of amount of loan received by actor i, and I is the financial institution used by actor i. 
The linear representation of this model in Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) specification 
can be given by 
  
Yi   = Dependent variable; Xi   = Vector of explanatory variables; β = vector of coefficients; εi = 
stochastic error term. Borrowing from the works of [31], [32], [30] and [33], the linear empirical 
moment equation is given as   
 
where 
  = empirical moment equation; mi = i-th moment condition;  = number of moment 
conditions; K = number of parameters; Zi = vector of instruments; N = number of observations;   = 
parameters vector. Yi   represents   lnLi which is the log of amount received as credit by i-th cassava 
actor in Naira. The   is the ℓ-vector and each ℓ-moment equation is a sample moment which is 
averaged over N. The GMM estimator for  is thus the parameter value that solves for zero. 
If ℓ = ,  there is exact solution to the empirical moment equation. However, there is over-
identification   ℓ >   and under-identification    ℓ < ; in which case it will be impossible to 
find solution and there will not be a unique solution, respectively.  
Distance to source of credit was used as an instrumental variable in the model and post-
estimation analysis results affirmed its appropriateness. In essence, commercial banks might have 
fewer branches than microfinance banks since they are mostly found in urban centers. Smaller size 
and less bureaucracy in microfinance banks make them to be better tailored towards the needs of 
the clients. Thus, there is possibility of such mini-banks to be more proliferated and thus closer to 
cassava actors than the mega-banks. On the other hand, the amount of loan granted an actor is a 
function of individual and institutional factors.  
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1.   Characteristics of the Cassava Value Chain Actors 
The general overview of the characteristics of the cassava value chain actors are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that most of the actors were males and were married, with 
agriculture as their main source of income. Porter [34] had earlier shown that less women were 
usually found outside microcredit financing settings. Approximately two-third of the actors were 
members of associations and patronized microfinance banks, while one-fourth were farmers. 
Among the financial institutions patronised by actors, commercial banks were the least-used. In 
addition, actors were fairly-distributed with respect to the scale of operation. For instance, two (2) 
out of every five (5) actors were operating on medium scale while one (1) out of every five (5) 
operated large-scale businesses, suggesting the medium scale as the most preferred scale of 
operation among the actors. 
Table 2 on the other hand, indicates that on average, an actor was about 44 years of age, spent 
about 12 years in formal education setting, had family size of 7 persons and 13 years of experience 
in his/her enterprise. This shows that on a general note, the actors were educated young adults with 
fairly large family and were well-experienced in their occupational activities. With respect to the 
finances, the actors got an average of N63,624.00 ($386.44) as monthly income while they requested 
for less than N0.5 million ($3,036.93) as loan, out of which approximately half was granted. This 
was repaid over a period of about a year at a very low average interest rate (0.13%). The results 
 = 
′  +                                   … (3) 




! = 1  "( )

=1
! = "#$ % = 0           … (4) 





revealed very high variations among actors in the monthly income, amount of loan requested and 
granted, as reflected by the standard deviation, minimum and maximum values.  
Table 1.  Distribution of actors by socioeconomic, enterprise and financial institution characteristics. 
Variable Description Frequency Percentage 
Sex Male 115 68.45 
 Female 53 31.55 
Marital status Married 151 89.88 
 Single 17 10.12 
Primary occupation Agriculture 134 79.76 
 Non-Agriculture 34 20.24 
Association membership Yes 110 65.48 
 No 58 34.52 
Specialization   Producer 132 78.57 
 Processor 21 12.50 
 Marketer 12 7.14 
 Fabricator 2 1.19 
 End-User 1 0.60 
Scale of operation Small 61 36.31 
 Medium 72 42.86 
 Large 35 20.83 
Institution type  Government Bank 26 15.48 
 Cooperative Bank 19 11.31 
 Commercial Bank 15   8.93 
 Microfinance Bank 108 64.29 
           Number of observations  168 100.0 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics of continuous socioeconomic and loan variables. 
Variables Mean  Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Age (yrs) 44.03 9.26 25 80 
Years of education 11.52 4.82 0 32 
Household size 6.70 2.95 1 19 
Years of specialisation 13.15 10.65 1 60 
Experience with financial institutions (yrs) 4.80 4.43 1 21 
Monthly income (N) 63, 623.80 74, 879.38 4, 000.00 530, 000.00 
Loan requested (N) 418, 184.50 808, 800.30 15, 000.00 6, 000 000.00 
Loan granted (N) 274, 565.50 511, 322.30 10, 000.00 5, 000 000.00 
Loan duration (months) 11.53 6.13 1.00 36.00 
Interest rate (%) 0.13 0.10 0 0.36 
 Exchange rate: $1 = N164.64 [28] 
Figure 1 shows further characteristics of cassava value chain actors with respect to loan 
acquisition. About 97% of the actors paid interest on their loans. Interest rates are mostly required 
in loans because it is considered as earning on capital. However, what is quite interesting in Figure 
1 is that a relatively small number of actors (2.98%) did not pay interest on loans accessed. A further 
examination of the data revealed that these set of actors got loans only from agricultural banks 
which were government-owned. Apart from the interest rate, actors were asked to pay service 
charges and present collaterals. Credits given to approximately three (3) out of every five (5) actors 
were conditioned upon their presentation of collateral. Disaggregating on financial institution basis 
shows that about 73% of the actors that got credit from commercial banks were asked to supply 
collateral. This contrasts with cooperative bank where about 16% of the respondents were required 
to give collateral. This situation similarly played out in microfinance and agricultural banks where 
about 41% and 35% respectively were asked for collateral. Furthermore, about 97% of the actors got 
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their credit in cash while about 77% got it on time. Securing credit in cash gives opportunity of 
liquidity to be able to pay for various business activities [35] while timely access is crucial to 
procuring input at the right time. Adebayo and Adeola [9] noted that credit obtained by most of the 
small-scale farmers in Oyo state were used to pay for labour wages suggesting that loans secured as 
cash were very critical to the production processes. Perhaps, as a way of ensuring that the credit 
was used for the intended purpose, it was not disbursed to the actors at once but staggered over a 
period.          
 
Figure 1. Additional loan characteristics of cassava value chain actors. 
4.2.  Loan Request and Financial Institution Characteristics 
The results in Table 3 presents the average values of loan variables (amounts requested and 
granted, loan ratio, loan duration, interest rate) broken down by specialization, scale of operation 
and financial institution. From the table, fabricators put up highest average amount of loan request 
perhaps as a result of huge capital requirement for machine/equipment manufacture. Processors, 
producers and marketers however had relatively low amount of loan request in decreasing order. 
Processors were observed to be close to fabricators in terms of loan request, probably due to similar 
high cost requirement for machine procurement. Producers, processors and marketers however, 
had high credit access rate ranging from 77.1% to about 80.0% while their interest rates were about 
half of that of fabricators (25.0%). Low capital requirement and the possibility of higher frequency 
of loan turnover conferred advantage on them, unlike the case of fabricators. However, the 
fabricators had highest loan duration (21 months). These findings may suggest that higher loan 
disbursement and the incentive of longer repayment period are possibly influenced by readiness to 
pay higher interest rate since the financial institutions were mostly profit-oriented and therefore 
want to make the best use of the available fund. The low repayment period observed for most of the 
actors in the result has actually been identified as the bane of agricultural financing [36].        
Large scale of operation conferred advantage of high loan access (81.0%) and better loan terms 
(i.e. low interest rate with reasonable loan duration) to the actors. The amount of loans requested 
from commercial banks was the highest despite their high interest rate. This was followed by 
government banks while cooperative banks had the least requested amount of loan. In addition, 
commercial banks had the highest disbursement rate (88.0%) while the government bank was the 
least in disbursement rate (73.6%). It was observed that most of the requests made to government 
banks were not met probably as a result of credit rationing. Low interest rates charged by 
government banks might have served as incentive for requests but these could not be attended to as 
a result of inadequate fund. On the other hand, high interest rate was charged by both commercial 
and cooperative banks probably as a result of high transaction cost and the fact that privately-
owned initiatives are usually profit-oriented [35]. With the exception of government banks which 
are publicly owned and welfare-driven, microfinance banks were the only banks with low interest 
rate charges. There is the possibility that the low interest rate charged by this bank could have 






















loans (76.3%) requests for. More so, the amount of loans requested by the clients are often micro 
(microloans) in nature and could easily be repaid, thereby reducing default rate to the minimum.  
Table 3. Average values of loan variables by enterprise and financial institution characteristics. 










Specialization  Producer 427 840.90 293 083.30 0.7711 11.5 0.14 
Processor 479 523.80 221 428.60 0.7946 11.4 0.12 
Marketer 200 833.30 168 333.30 0.7944 11.5 0.11 
Fabricator 600 000.00 335 000.00 0.6750 21.0 0.25 
End-user 100 000.00 100 000.00 1.0000 6.0 0.03 
Scale of 
operation 
Small 256 311.50 187 409.80 0.7539 10.4 0.18 
Medium 541 250.00 309 375.00 0.7776 12.6 0.12 
Large 447 142.90 354 857.10 0.8104 11.3 0.07 
Financial 
institutions 
Government 607 307.70 244 807.70 0.7361 15.8 0.10 
Cooperatives 160 526.30 97 894.00 0.8195 6.6 0.26 
Commercial 950 000.00 756 666.70 0.8796 16.7 0.21 
Microfinance 344 120.40 245 851.90 0.7633 10.7 0.11 
Exchange rate: $1 = N164.64 [28] 
Furthermore, the general credit access situation was highly positive as shown by the average loan 
ratio value of 0.78 for all the 
actors in Table 4.            
  
 







4.3   Determinants of Credit Accessed by Cassava Value Chain Actors  
Results of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression parameter estimates on determinants of 
credit access are presented in Table 5. Robust variant of the regression was run to control for 
heteroscedasticity and the mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 1.61 indicates the absence of 
multicollinearity. Diagnostic statistics indicate non-significance of F-statistics for the Ramsey RESET 
Test (acceptance of the null of no omitted variables) thus confirming the suitability of the model, 
including right choice of variables. This was confirmed by the link test result. About ten (10) 
variables were significant between 5 and 10% levels. These include household size, years of 
education, monthly income, scale of operation (medium) and interest rate charged on loan which all 
had positive relationship with amount of loan received while sex (female) and specialization 
(marketer & fabricator) had negative relationship with the loan variable. On the other hand, 
coefficients of financial institution variables showed mixed result relationships. 
The results in Table 5 further indicates that a unit (100%) increase in the number of females 
accessing credit relative to males reduced the amount of credit obtained by 49.8%, depicting the sex 
dimension to credit access. In contrast, a unit increase in years of formal education improved credit 
amount by 3.7%. Higher education level indicates higher human capacity which is rewarded with 
increased awareness of the type of loan and loan processing and hence better access. Moreover, 
Table 4. Summary statistics of loan ratio of cassava value 
chain actors. 
Statistic Value 
Mean  0.78 
Median 0.95 







credit access increased with monthly income of the actors though the effect was minimal. One of the 
requirements for accessing loans from financial institutions is the income flow of the applicant, 
hence a good income flow as shown by monthly income increases the possibility of a successful 
loan request. Moreover, income might be indirectly linked to credit through savings. Actors with 
high income have tendency of setting some amount aside as savings with formal or informal 
institutions and this might be used as a pivot to get credit from such institutions. These savings 
might be generally low, but they have profound effect on agricultural credit [2]. Amount of credit is 
elastic to interest rate. A unit increase in interest rate increased the amount of credit by 188.5%. The 
association of high interest rate with better credit access might not be intuitive because ordinarily, 
high interest rate should discourage access. For instance, [2] noted that interest rates charged by 
financial institutions, with special reference to commercial banks, had negative effect on credit 
available to the agricultural sector. However, actors might need to overlook the higher interest rate 
in a bid to get needed fund to run their enterprises. In addition, they may feel more comfortable 
accessing loans from financial institutions that charge high interest rate if they are sure of getting 
the fund. To buttress this point, results from Table 3 showed that cassava actors accessed large 
credit from commercial banks that were charging high interest rates (comparatively), laying 
credence to the explanation. A similar case of non-intuitive credit-interest rate relationship is 
repayment rate that was found to relate positively with interest rate [38]. However, it would be 
better for the loan recipient to pay in time in order to reduce the interest accrued to the loan which 
would make repayment prohibitive. 
Moreover, a unit (100%) increase in  the usage of commercial and cooperative banks by actors 
increased the amount of credit obtained from commercial bank by 98.2% points but reduced 
amount of credit got from cooperative bank by 77.1% points, relative to government banks (Table 
5). The advantageous position of commercial banks may be because of high capacity to fund 
business concerns from their capital base. On enterprise characteristics, a unit increase in  the 
number of medium-scale entrepreneurs relative to small-scale business owners improved the 
amount of credit by 51.7% points. Financial institutions will feel secure transacting with business 
entities where there is ease of monitoring, as a way of preventing default. More so, banks get 
considerably higher profit on loans given to big farms than to small farms even under the same loan 
terms [39]. Among the actors, marketers and the fabricators were the ones having significant 
influence on credit. A unit increase in the number of marketers and fabricators willing to access 
credit relative to producers reduced the amount of credit to be obtained by these two groups of 
actors by 45.1% and 100.9% points, respectively. The worse credit access situation of the fabricators 
might be a result of huge capital requirement for machineries which financial institutions might not 
want to buy-into as a result of risk involved or fund being tied down. The case of marketer was fair 
since the enterprise is variable-cost-dominated and the fund could be turned around severally.        
Table 5. Parameter estimates of the determinants of credit access by actors from financial institutions. 
Variable Coefficient Robust standard 
error 
    t-statistics P > | t | 
Age -0.0008 0.0081 -0.09 0.927 
Sex: Female -0.4979*** 0.1379 -3.61 0.000 
Marital status: Single -0.1451 0.2992 -0.48 0.629 
Years of education  0.0369** 0.0154  2.39 0.018 
Household size  0.0468* 0.0262  1.78 0.076 
Primary occupation: Agric. -0.3032 0.1894 -1.60 0.112 
Years of specialization  0.0025 0.0074  0.33 0.739 
Monthly income  4.63E-06*** 1.49E-07  3.11 0.002 
Association membership -0.0119 0.1281 -0.09 0.926 
Interest rate  1.8852* 1.0341  1.82 0.070 
Financial institution type     
        Cooperative -0.7705** 0.3214 -2.40 0.018 
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        Commercial  0.9823*** 0.3207  3.06 0.003 
        Microfinance  0.0359 0.2066  0.17 0.862 
Scale of operation     
        Medium  0.5174*** 0.1913  2.70 0.008 
        Large  0.1046 0.2692  0.39 0.698 
Specialisation (VCA)     
        Processor  0.1825 0.2968  0.61 0.540 
        Marketer -0.4509* 0.2315 -1.95 0.053 
        Fabricator -1.0089* 0.6082 -1.66 0.099 
        End User -0.5005 0.3605 -1.39 0.167 
Constant  10.8198*** 0.4792  22.58 0.000 
Post-estimation Results     
Ramsey RESET Test F (3,145) = 1.98 Prob > F=0.1196   
Multicollinearity test Mean VIF = 1.61 Min VIF=1.15 Max VIF=2.72  
Linktest _hatsq: t = 0.99 P > | t |=0.324   
 F (2,165) = 83.74 Prob > F=0.000   
VCA – Value Chain Action; Observations: 168; R-squared= 0.5008;   Level of Sig.: ***1%, **5%, *1%.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The study assessed the effect of financial institution type on the amount of credit received by 
cassava value chain actors in Nigeria. Some key points manifested in the data as well as the results 
of the analyses carried out. Commercial bank had the least number of patronages, but the amount 
of credit involved in the limited number of transactions was enormous as reflected in the average 
credit disbursement. Government bank took the second position while cooperative bank was in the 
rear. Amount of credit was highly elastic to change in interest rate. In addition, the study showed 
that higher loan disbursement and the incentive of longer repayment period were possibly 
influenced by readiness to pay higher interest rate. This is actually true for large amounts; 
otherwise, low interest rate will encourage access. Endogenous relationship was also established 
between amount of credit and the financial institution type. This finding is particularly important in 
agricultural value chain financing research which will should prompt wider testing across cassava-
producing African countries.  
In all, Nigerian financial institutions are on the right track of cassava value chain commercialization 
through provision of credit for industrialization and value chain up scaling with the commercial 
banks playing leading role. However, the importance of the pseudo-formal and self-help 
institutions is pertinent as is the case in several African countries. The financial institutions should 
therefore be encouraged in these efforts through policies that allow private-sector initiatives to 
flourish and complement public-sector responsibility. Decision makers should focus on how 
financial institutions can be strengthened for better credit access by the cassava actors, and hence 
improve their productivity. The study suggests that further research should be conducted on how 
public-private partnership can improve loan size and guarantee in Nigeria and by extension other 
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  Figure A.1 Distributions of the amounts of loan requested and loan granted  
 
  Figure A.2 Distributions of the interest rate and loan duration 
 
Table A.1 Summary statistics of loan variables by financial institutions. 
Variable Financial 
Institution 
Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Loan requested (N) Government 607 307.70 202 500.00 1 236 227.00 100 000.00 6 000 000.00 
 Cooperative 160 526.30 50 000.00 205 682.40 40 000.00 800 000.00 
 Commercial 950 000.00 500 000.00 1 224 307.00 100 000.00 5 000 000.00 
 Microfinance 344 120.40 200 000.00 628 492.40 15 000.00 5 000 000.00 
Loan granted (N) Government 244 807.70 150 000.00 283 776.30 100 000.00 1 300 000.00 
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 Commercial 756 666.70 400 000.00 791 749.10 100 000.00 3 000 000.00 
 Microfinance 245 851.90 125 000.00 512 584.90 10 000.00 5 000 000.00 
Loan ratio Government 0.736 0.750 0.280 0.060 1.000 
 Cooperative 0.819 1.000 0.361 0.060 1.000 
 Commercial 0.880 1.000 0.162 0.500 1.000 
 Microfinance 0.763 0.817 0.262 0.100 1.000 
Loan duration 
(months) 
Government 15.77 12.00 7.62 1.00 36.00 
 Cooperative 6.63 6.00 1.89 6.00 12.00 
 Commercial 16.67 18.00 6.75 4.00 24.00 
 Microfinance 10.66 10.00 5.04 1.00 36.00 
Interest rate (%) Government 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.30 
 Cooperative 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.25 0.26 
 Commercial 0.21 0.23 0.08 0.02 0.28 
 Microfinance 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.36 
  Exchange rate: $1 = N164.64 [28] 
 
 
Table A.2 Summary statistics of loan variables by specialization  
Variable Specialty Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Loan requested (N) Producer 427 840.90 200 000.00    756 832.30   30 000.00 5 000 000.00 
 Processor 479 523.80 200 000.00 1 276 995.00   15 000.00 6 000 000.00 
 Marketer 200 833.00 150 000.00    201 875.70   30 000.00    800 000.00 
 Fabricator 600 000.00 600 000.00    565 685.40 200 000.00 1 000 000.00 
 End-user 100 000.00 100 000.00 . 100 000.00    100 000.00 
Loan granted (N) Producer 293 083.30 150 000.00 561 063.60   22 000.00 5 000 000.00 
 Processor 221 428.60 150 000.00 285 206.70   10 000.00 1 300 000.00 
 Marketer 168 333.30 100 000.00 205 684.40   10 000.00    800 000.00 
 Fabricator 335 000.00 335 000.00 233 345.20 170 000.00    500 000.00 
 End-user 100 000.00 100 000.00 . 100 000.00    100 000.00 
Loan ratio Producer 0.771 1.000 0.281 0.060 1.000 
 Processor 0.794 0.750 0.240 0.217 1.000 
 Marketer 0.794 0.900 0.248 0.333 1.000 
 Fabricator 0.675 0.675 0.247 0.500 0.850 
 End-user 1 1 . 1 1 
Loan duration 
(months) 
Producer 11.45 11.0 5.69 1 36 
 Processor 11.38 10.00 8.81 1 36 
 Marketer 11.50 12.00 4.68 4 24 
 Fabricator 21.00 21.00 4.24 18 24 
 End-User 6.00 6.00 . 6 6 
Interest rate (%) Producer 0.14 0.10 0.10 0 0.36 
 Processor 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.30 
 Marketer 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.25 
 Fabricator 0.26 0.26 0.04 0.23 0.28 
 End-User 0.03 0.03 . 0.03 0.03 
  Exchange rate: $1 = N164.64 [28] 
 
Table A.3 Summary statistics of loan variables by scale of operation  
Variable Scale  Mean Median Std. dev.  Min.  Max.  
Loan requested (N) Small 256 311.50 180 000.00    270 733.40 15 000.00 1 000 000.00 
 Medium 541 250.00 200 000.00 1 040 490.00 50 000.00 6 000 000.00 
 High 447 142.90 200 000.00    861 982.40   30 000.00 5 000 000.00 
Loan granted (N) Small 187 409.80 100 000.00    244 080.40 10 000.00 1 000 000.00 
 Medium 309 375.00 150 000.00    473 455.90   40 000.00 3 000 000.00 
 High 354 857.10 150 000.00    829 529.90 30 000.00 5 000 000.00 
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Loan ratio Small 0.754 0.800 0.286 0.089 1.000 
 Medium 0.778 0.842 0.264 0.060 1.000 
 High 0.810 1.000 0.265 0.200 1.000 
Loan duration 
(months) 
Small 10.36 10.00 5.92 1 24 
 Medium 12.64 12.00 6.47 1 36 
 High 11.29 10.00 5.47 1 36 
Interest rate (%) Small 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.02 0.30 
 Medium 0.12 0.08 0.10 0 0.36 
 High 0.07 0.04 0.07 0 0.30 






Appendix B: Supplementary Materials 
Kernel Distribution of loan ratios 
        Figure B1 which shows the kernel distribution of loan ratios for all actors, indicates the 
existence of a left-skewed distribution for the loan ratio among actors which suggests that there 
were more low loan ratio values than high values. 
 
   
Figure B.1 Kernel distribution of loan ratio for all actors                    
 
Treatment of Endogenous Relationship 
         Possible endogenous relationship between the amount of loan and institution type was tested 
with instrumental variable (IV) regression. The results presented in Tables S1&2 revealed that 
institution type was truly endogenous to the amount of loan going by the output of the endogeneity 
test. Furthermore, the null hypotheses of under-identification (Anderson LM test) and weak 
identification (Cragg-Donald Wald test) were rejected and Sargan statistic result showed exact 
identification of the IV regression equation. These imply that the excluded instrument, distance to 
credit source, is relevant. Credit amount showed increase with education and household size. More 
education years gives better human capacity leverage through improved earnings that could assist 
in getting loans. Positive effect of household size could be viewed from different angles: if all 
members of the household are involved in the enterprise, the high capacity of the business mean 
more needs for credit. Secondly, responsibility of taking care of many members could drive the 
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Table B.1 Parameter estimates of the determinants of the amount of loan granted cassava actors. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z-statistics P > |z| 
Age -0.0096 0.0107 -0.89 0.153 
Sex -0.2972 0.2332 -1.27 0.203 
Marital status  0.1882 0.3251 0.58 0.563 
Years of education  0.0537*** 0.0205 2.62 0.009 
Household size  0.0589* 0.0337 1.75 0.080 
Primary occupation -0.0445 0.2477 -0.18 0.857 
Years of specialisation  0.0112 0.0103 1.09 0.274 
Monthly income  2.07e-06 1.47e-06 1.40 0.160 
Association membership -0.2878 0.2116 -1.36 0.174 
Interest rate  0.9674 1.4180 0.68 0.496 
Financial institution type -0.4071 0.2848 -1.43 0.153 
Scale of operation  0.1307 0.1686 0.77 0.438 
Specialization  0.1425 0.1354 1.05 0.293 
Constant  11.7297*** 1.0030 11.69 0.000 
No. of observations: 143   
Centered R-squared: -0.0283   
Uncentered R-squared: 0.9932   
F-value: F (13, 129) = 2.73; Prob>F=0.0019   
 
Table B.2 Postestimation results of 2-step IV GMM regression. 
                  Test Statistics 
Under-identification test (Anderson canon. Corr. LM 
statistics): 
10.568; chi-sq (1) P-value=0.0012 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics): 10.294 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size=16.38; 15% maximal IV size= 8.96 
                                                                   20% maximal IV size= 6.66; 25% maximal IV size=5.53 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission. 
Sargan statistics (over-identification tests of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 4.893 
chi-sq (1) P-value=0.0270 
Regressors tested  
Instrumented:                Financial institution type  
Included instruments:   Age, Sex, Marital status, Years of education, Household size, Primary occupation, 
Years of specialization, Monthly income, Association membership, Interest rate, Scale of operation, 
Specialization.  
Excluded instrument:  Distance to credit source 
 
Appendix C 





LGAs EAs % Used for 
selection 
Num. % Num % 
 
South West 
Oyo 33 29 35,534 31 26 
Ogun 20 17 18,518 17 14 
 
South East 
Enugu 16 14 13,997 12 14 
Abia 18 15 11570 11 14 
South South Rivers 22 19 24,871 23 18 
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North Central FCT 06 06 3787 06 14 
 
Table C.2 Distribution and retrieval of questionnaires by zone and actor type. 
  
 Actor type 
 
Zones 
SW SE SS NC All 
Proposed Retrieved Proposed Retrieved Proposed Retrieved Proposed Retrieved Proposed Retrieved 
Formal fin. 
institutions 
36 11 36 22 18 15 18 4 108 52 
Cooperatives 96 16 96 21 48 16 48 7 288 65 
Individuals  172 68 172 68 86 13 86 38 516 200 
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• Commercial banks least-patronized but had high disbursement level because of huge 
amount involved. 
• Amount of credit was highly elastic to interest rate. 
• Role of pseudo-formal and self-help institutions pertinent. 
• Endogenous relationship exists between loan amount and institution type.   
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